

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MUHAMMAD H. MUTTI,

Plaintiff,

-against-

PLANET MOTOR CARS INC., *also known*
as Planet Motor Cars,

Defendant.

23-CV-2767 (LTS)

TRANSFER ORDER

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff brings this *pro se* action under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1666, alleging that Defendant Planet Motor Cars Inc. (“Planet Motor”) failed to disclose terms of an agreement for the sale of a vehicle. Planet Motor is located in Hempstead, Nassau County, New York. For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

DISCUSSION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

Under Section 1391(c), a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2).

Plaintiff alleges that he and Planet Motor entered into an agreement regarding the sale of a vehicle at Planet Motor, which is located in Nassau County. Because Planet Motor is located in Nassau County, it is subject to personal jurisdiction in that county; thus, it resides in Nassau County for the purposes of Section 1391(b)(1). Accordingly, because Planet Motor resides in Nassau County, and the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in that county, from the face of the complaint, it is clear that venue is not proper in this Court under Section 1391(b)(1), (2).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406, if a plaintiff files a case in the wrong venue, the Court "shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Plaintiff's claims arose in Nassau County, which is in the Eastern District of New York. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 112. Accordingly, venue lies in the Eastern District of New York, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), and in the interest of justice, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this Court. This order closes this case.

The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore *in forma pauperis* status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. *See Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 4, 2023
New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
Chief United States District Judge